WEB SPECIAL - The First Sea Lord

The First Sea Lord

The last time Iain Ballantyne conducted a wide-ranging interview with Admiral Sir Alan West, the UK's Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, it was early 2003 and the Royal Navy was committing a substantial task group to the Iraq War, under Operation Telic. Since playing a key role in the Coalition victory, the British fleet has remained committed to operations in the Gulf, while back home it has faced the daunting challenge of balancing scarce resources with present and future commitments that require substantial investment in cutting edge technology and equipment. Here, Admiral West and this magazine's Editor discuss where the Royal Navy currently stands and how it intends bridging the gap between today and tomorrow.

Above: First Sea Lord in Iraq (Royal Navy photo)

Below: HMS Victorious arriving for her refit at Plymouth (Nick Newns photo).

Where does the Royal Navy stand today?

"The first thing I would say is that I think the Navy is in good heart. Whenever I travel around and meet the Navy's sailors, marines and members of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, I am constantly impressed with how well they are doing their jobs and also their good morale."

If Operation Telic was the driver for the Royal Navy's activities two years ago, what is it today?

"The key driver is to transform the Royal Navy into a Versatile Maritime Force, ensuring it has the capability to project power on land, is a fleet optimised for littoral warfare but without giving up its blue water role. It is a transformation that takes time, because large capital assets like ships take a long time to come on line. We must ensure they will be able to keep pace with the evolving operational tasks by building in as much flexibility as possible. It also takes time, of course, to create the structures that provide the properly trained and motivated men and women who will operate the future fleet."

What are the objectives of this Versatile Maritime Force of the future?

"In short it must be able to guarantee assured access to insert Royal Marines and to project power ashore."

So, what do you need to guarantee all that?

"The key to a future fleet structure able to fulfil those objectives, is to get the order for the new carriers placed. You will recall that two years ago, I was optimistic the order would be finalised in the near future. We now need to order the carriers and start cutting steel. There have been statements from Ministers to the effect that they will be ordered and it is Government policy to build them. Even so, we have still not got there."

Royal Marines training with the new Viking armoured vehicle (Royal Navy photo)

Other countries are pressing ahead with their new carriers programmes - the French, the Italians and the Americans for example - so why the delay in the UK?

"There are various aspects of the programme that need to be ironed out, including matters related to the industrial partnership that is to build them, and then there is cost of the new ships and how we make the money available within the overall defence budget."

Some would suggest this is a smokescreen for the fact that the Government is reluctant to put its money where its mouth is... in other words that, having committed UK defence policy to expeditionary warfare, and the ships needed to pursue it, the current administration doesn't want to write the cheques.

"The new carriers were a key part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Government remained committed to them in the post-September 11 'New Chapter' of the SDR and in the White Paper at the end of 2004."

So, are there roadblocks being thrown in the programme's path by the other Services?

"You cannot have a serious expeditionary warfare capability without aircraft carriers and that is something the heads of all three UK Armed Forces agree on."

But isn't it all a bit like the situation in the late 1960s when the Royal Navy last tried to build carriers of a similar size?

"Well, with the CVA01 programme the reasoning behind their cancellation was that the Royal Navy was no longer going to operate 'East of Suez'.

However, in 2005, it is clear that British defence policy once again involves UK forces operating 'East of Suez'. But, let's not narrow it down to that criterion. If any nation wants to be a serious player on the international stage, it needs carrier air power of the kind provided by the CVF, no matter where the theatre of operations is. To do without carriers you need significant host nation support, but these days that is less forthcoming than it was before. Similarly over-flight rights are not easy to obtain and creating a land base overseas is always costly regardless of host nation support. It also has to be protected. In short, the logic behind building these ships is greater. I would like to get rid of the uncertainty over them as soon possible. There is no doubt that we have taken some hits on the current fleet in order to enable that to happen. The structure we are creating, which includes taking cutbacks in the short term, does not make sense without the new carriers."

What would happen if the Royal Navy didn't get them?

"We would have to ask if we are happy with only eight Type 45 destroyers. We would possibly have to make up for the lack of carrier-based deep strike with more Type 45s and also give them a Tactical Tomahawk capability."

In the last edition of this magazine some of our writers were pretty gloomy about the current status of the Royal Navy, suggesting that in the wake of the recent cuts it is a force in crisis. From what you are saying, it is clear that you see it as a case of being pragmatic in the short term to achieve the longer-term goals.

"Part of the reasoning behind the force level cuts was because we need to keep money in the programme for the future carriers and it was also driven by budgetary pressure today, especially with regard to operational commitments versus force levels. I have made it clear elsewhere that taking the hits has not been easy. My personal view, and I said it during a House of Commons Defence Committee hearing, is that I am sorry more of the UK's GDP is not devoted to Defence. But that decision is the responsibility of the Government, which is obviously tasked with deciding national policy by the electorate."

Perhaps it is a case of the Defence budget failing to match the real worth of the Armed Forces?

"Our soldiers, sailors and airmen are fine ambassadors for UK Plc and the British forces are universally respected as consummate professionals who are, as the phrase goes, a Force for Good in the world. But the Chancellor would say that there is already enough spent on the Armed Forces, particularly when you consider that the Treasury funds front line operations such as Iraq on top of the actual Defence budget. That is the totality he looks at. The Chancellor will also point out that he has increased Defence spending during the life of this Government, which is true, but of course it is nowhere near the level of increase enjoyed by Health, Education and other vital areas."

Is it realistic, with just 25 such ships left in the fleet, to only have a dozen frigates and destroyers available at any one time to deal with a major war-fighting operation?

"I have been in the Navy for 40 years and in my time have fought in a fairly large maritime war - the Falklands - where, of 23 frigates and destroyers sent to the South Atlantic in the task force, four were sunk and eight were damaged. My own ship was sunk in Falkland Sound. It was a pretty high attrition rate. Therefore having only a dozen major surface warships available for an operation is indeed likely to be unrealistic. In fact, this country needs about 30 surface combatants to carry out standing tasks and handle contingencies like sending a task group to take part in a major operation. The reduction from 32 to 25 frigates and destroyers was only accepted with great reluctance. However, the package of money that the Royal Navy receives does not allow us to have 30 destroyers and frigates, especially as the future carrier, amphibious ships and other programmes are a high priority."

Mine Counter-Measures Vessels have also been inexorably reduced over the past few years too...are you happy with that?

"The number of MCMVs we have reduced to is something we can accept, as it still enables us to preserve a niche capability in which we lead the world. It is sad to lose the MCMVs that were used on the Northern Ireland patrol, as it is one more example of an area where we could give officers a ship command opportunity at an early age being taken away. It is also unfortunate, with a increased emphasis these days on Homeland Security, that we now have fewer ships available for that task."

HMS Norfolk, one of the frigates axed from service (Mike Welsford photo)

There have been some hard choices for the Royal Navy, but are there more ahead for the UK Armed Forces as a whole? There has been talk that there is simply not enough money for the future carrier, the next batch of Eurofighter and Joint Strike Fighter.

"Such talk reflects the fact that there is pressure on the Defence budget, but I do not believe it is a matter of making choices between those programmes. Carrier aviation - the UK's Joint Strike Capability, as embodied by the CVF and the Joint Strike Fighter - is too important to the defence of this country. The Eurofighter is a good aeroplane, but it was not designed to be deployed all over the world in an expeditionary warfare environment. To put it simply, Britain needs both the JSF and the CVF."

But people look at these two big ships, the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, that cost a lot of money and they are tempted to suggest that Britain cannot afford them.

"The total cost of the programme, ships and JSF, is £12 billion of which three billion is for the ships. These things also need to be put in a wider context...I believe the RAF's MRA4 Nimrod programme, for a dozen aircraft also costs around three billion. Therefore, in Defence terms, and bearing in mind the huge capability delivered by the CVFs, the cost is not that extraordinary."

Has the size of the CVFs actually been fixed yet?

"That cannot be stated definitively until it has been decided how many aircraft are to be in the ships' air groups. We feel that they need to carry at least 36 JSFs to generate proper sortie rates and that means a ship of around 60,000 tonnes."

Earlier you mentioned that the heads of all three armed forces recognise the importance of expeditionary warfare and having the carriers...but do they REALLY believe in them, to the extent that they would keep the carriers at the expense of their own programmes?

"When they consider the requirements for modern defence of Britain and her interests world-wide, in their hearts they must know that building the carriers and giving them proper air groups is the right thing to do. However, the Chief of the Air Staff will want Eurofighter as his priority while the Chief of the General Staff will see his Future Rapid Effects System, a new family of armoured vehicles, as his key programme. I would expect them to fight their corners."

But would you argue that a carrier is a Joint Warfare enabler rather than purely a Royal Navy asset?

"It is run by the Navy but it is a platform for all three armed forces and, without a CVF on hand during some future war, let's say in 20 years time, soldiers will be killed, and sailors will also lose their lives. We could see a re-run of the Falklands situation where, as you will recall, surface warships were sunk and a vessel carrying troops was destroyed, due to the fact the Navy did not have the capability to deter enemy air aircraft before they got too close. The Sea Harriers did well but a big carrier with air superiority fighters, like the Phantom and Airborne Early Warning aircraft, could have done even better. No one should assume that land-based air power could always provide the air protection needed. In Korea, the withdrawal from Aden and in the Falklands conflict the task of providing air cover came down to the Navy because carriers are always where the action is. And I hope my air force colleagues will forgive me, but it is worth pointing out that since WW2 there has only been one enemy aircraft shot down by a land-based British aircraft. The rest have been claimed by carrier-based aircraft."

That would be news to most people in Britain, because they think that anything that flies belongs to the RAF and anyone wearing camouflage belongs to the Army. I can't help feeling that the Royal Navy's idea that because it does so well in the air, at sea and on land, then everyone else automatically knows that too. In reality, there is in fact a problem with public perception of what the Navy does, isn't there?

"We do need to change that, but it isn't just the Navy that suffers from the amazing 'sea blindness' affecting the UK. The merchant sector is also unsung and it is important, with Trafalgar 200 coming up, and with Sea Britain 2005, that we are taking a fresh look at the sea. I hope that in 2005 we will be able to drive home what a jewel the Royal Navy is and how important the sea and the maritime sector is to the UK. The sea has an incredible influence on all our lives, both beneficial, in carrying 80 per cent of world trade and 95 per cent of the UK's, but also in a less welcome sense as we saw with the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean."

And I suppose it was the fact that the Royal Navy has that presence 'East of Suez' which you referred to earlier that enabled Britain to provide practical on the scene help off, and in, Sri Lanka in the wake of the disaster?

"The frigate Chatham was available as she was part of a multi-national counter-terrorist group operating in the Gulf, while the engineering support ship RFA Diligence was coming out of a refit at Singapore, plus we had a Leaf Class RFA tanker available too. The potential of all those sorts of ships in the wake of a natural disaster is considerable, from Chatham's helicopters and command and control facilities, plus her medics and other personnel, together with the workshops and additional facilities in Diligence, and of course her people too."

Two years on from the Iraq War, what in fact is the Royal Navy presence 'East of Suez'?

"On Boxing Day last year I went down to the Gulf to see for myself. The variety of work carried out by our naval people on land, at sea and in the air is quite incredible and, again, much of it is unsung. At Umm Qasr they are leading the effort to construct a naval base for the Iraqis, and in getting their patrol craft refurbished. The Royal Navy is also playing a key role in training Iraqi naval ratings and officers. We are also leading the effort to establish an Iraqi naval force that will take over protection of the offshore oil terminals, a duty currently performed by Coalition forces. The terminals earn Iraq £100 million a day, so they are crucial to the country's future. We are looking after them at the moment in conjunction with other Coalition navies. British Type 23 frigates have been doing their bit up north in the Gulf, in charge of the oil terminal protection. We are willing to put the Type 23s in much shallower waters than other Coalition navies might put ships of a similar size. The Type 23s also run the smaller patrol boats and carry out their own interdiction operations. The Royal Navy has also been taking part in policing Iraq's inland waterways by training up the country's fledgling riverine patrol force."

And what about further inland?

"At the time of my visit 40 Commando was coming to the end of a deployment in Iraq, which had seen them supporting the Black Watch with a mortar troop and snatch squads, conducting route protection in Baghdad and elsewhere and surge operations in the south. The Navy also has people in the divisional HQ at Basra Palace and of course 845 Naval Air Squadron operating out of the nearby airbase."

Are there any other unsung heroes in the Navy who, like some of the people in Iraq, perhaps don't get the attention they deserve?

"Every single day of the year we have a nuclear deterrent submarine on patrol and, in the extremely uncertain world that we live in, I am pleased that the UK has this capability. It is quite an achievement that the Royal Navy delivers it without fail, as it underwrites the security of the country and our allies. However, the decision on whether or not the UK should maintain its nuclear deterrent needs be taken in the next Parliament. The current Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarines need to be replaced by 2020, so someone needs to start thinking about it now. Whatever it is will have a long lead-in time. Personally, I don't think the UK should give up having a nuclear deterrent, but that is a decision for the politicians. Someone needs to make the decision."

There is definite future for the nuclear-powered attack submarine force in the shape of the Astutes, but is the designated SSN force level high enough?

"As you know, there has been an overall reduction in the force level in recent years, from 12 down to 10 and now eight. When there are eight Astutes, I think the Royal Navy will be able to live with it because, as new boats, the availability will be higher. But, at the moment, I am nervous about the number of hulls versus the number of tasks. The boats are older, so the availability is lower as they need more maintenance."

How important are the SSNs in the scheme of things?

"An SSN is the only guaranteed way of sinking an enemy unit and that potential frightens people. Very few navies will put to sea if they know an SSN is lurking out there somewhere under the sea. The Royal Navy will, the USN, French and possibly the Russians will, but the others will stay in port. SSNs can be deployed off an enemy shore without anyone knowing, even where the opposition has air superiority, and in addition to threatening surface warships can carry out surveillance, land Special Forces and launch cruise missiles to strike targets with precision deep inland. But they are expensive to run and nuclear ownership - providing the services and infrastructure to refit them - is also very costly, but we are working to drive that down."

But, will you ever get eight Astutes?

"Well, three have been ordered and a long lead-in for the fourth is planned and we will keep ordering them until we reach the stated number of eight."

When does the first Astute enter service?

"The first one is due to commission in 2009, which is much later than originally planned. The cause of the delay was the pause in submarine construction that the UK had after finishing the Vanguard Class. It takes a while to get the drumbeat of build going again."

And what of the Future Surface Combatant replacement for the Type 23s and the last four Type 22s?

"After we have eight Type 45s then we will go to the FSC. My message would be 'let us not stop building things in our yards'. That's when the problems start."

It's all very well talking about equipment, but as I think we mentioned last time we spoke in depth, people are your most important asset. What progress is being made in improving, or maintaining, conditions of service for them?

"As I am sure you know, it is all about achieving harmony between the time people spend on deployment with the time they spend at home with their families or receiving training. A crucial part of the Versatile Maritime Force is to make sure we have well-trained, capable people in the numbers we need to reach all our requirements. We are looking at how people do their jobs, assessing if the branches of service that we currently have are best matched to our operational needs. But as, I touched on earlier, we have to harmonise peoples' time away with their time at home. A major concern is that people are not willing to take separation as much as they were. We currently permit 660 days away out of three years, but this is more than either the Army or the Air Force, so it is worth looking at to see if we can improve the situation. Keeping our people happy is very important. They are the bedrock of the Naval Service."