WEB SPECIAL - Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations

For 40 years of the Cold War naval strategy and equipment policy was easy:The enemy (the Soviets) could be counted, their strength calculated in numbers of rounds and range, and equipment measured in frequency and decibels. It was only necessary to ensure that NATO could muster enough ships, aircraft and tanks to keep the Soviets out of Western European. The main theatre of operations would be war on the Central Front, a war of attrition between armies. The end of the Cold War - "the bonfire of the certainties" as the Secretary General of NATO calls it - meant that armed forces around the world had to seek a new rationale for their existence and future equipment policies. The Royal Navy led the way in this conceptual thinking, with two issues of its Maritime Doctrine, which were widely admired and copied.

Most remarkable was the development of a new concept called the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations (or MCJO for short). MCJO envisaged that in future wars, the Royal Navy would be the dominant player in a joint expeditionary force, and would need to ensure that it was optimised to make the most effective contribution. In MCJO it was argued that most operations would be conducted around the periphery of land masses, where over three quarters of the world's population, over 80% of its capital cities and nearly all major centres of international trade and military power are found. These operations would inevitably involve navies.

World trade routes also intersect in these so-called littoral areas, and increasingly important sources of off-shore oil, gas and minerals are located in adjacent waters. Effective operations, straddling the boundary between land and sea, would be crucially important either as the scene of an operation itself or as the focus for deploying and sustaining forces deeper inland.

Also, naval forces have unique attributes, principally sustained reach, forward presence, mobility and leverage. Use of the sea would offer unique access, in terms of movement, concentration of firepower, surprise or overt presence, to gain an advantageous position.Navies could also be used to deter an aggressor by deploying into a region at an early stage, and, if necessary, in considerable strength.

They could then apply packages of force against key targets to prevent, or impede, a potential aggressor from using force, with less danger of major escalation. An important facet of a joint warfare capability is the ability of maritime forces to threaten retribution should an opponent use capabilities, such as terrorism or BM, which are not necessarily themselves sea-based.

NAVIES, with their freedom of movement in international waters, would thus make a substantial contribution to joint warfare in the littoral. They could operate across the spectrum of missions, whether these were small to medium-sized operations, and could provide the conditions for subsequent operations by heavier or larger forces for more extensive tasks.

Sea-based forces could also conduct operations independently of Host Nation Support (HNS), while forces were being built up in a host nation, and during the movement on land of armies to their operating area.More extensive basing of forces at sea would also reduce the footprint of deployed forces and their potential vulnerability onshore.

WHEN the MCJO concept was unveiled in the late 1990s, the message to politicians was that navies - and in this case it meant the Royal Navy - was a flexible, low risk choice for a new post-Cold War defence strategy.

In fact a maritime strategy, such as Britain had employed at most other times in its history, was the strategy of choice. The Cold War and naval policy during the Cold War had been an aberration.

Events since 1998 have transformed the MCJO concept into reality. The RN's new Amphibious Ready Group (carrying 3 Commando Brigade), Carrier Battlegroups (carrying RAF GR7 and RN FA2 Harriers) and attack submarines (carrying Tomahawk missiles) have been very busy:

• Off Central America the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean and other amphibious ships provided disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Mitch.
• The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and a Carrier Battlegroup (CBG) have made decisive deployments to waters off Sierra Leone to save a UN peace-keeping mission from collapse.
• In the Middle East, exercises and operations involving the ARG and a CBG have helped to contain Saddam's Iraq.
• In the Adriatic the deployment of an attack submarine helped to underscore the determination of the international community to see fair elections in Serbia.

The Labour Government's decision to order new 50,000 tonnes aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy, and its commitment to the Joint Strike Fighter to fly from them, is proof that MCJO is proven today and is the right answer for tomorrow.

Photos: Royal Navy.