WEB SPECIAL - AMPHIBIOSITY

Amphibiosity: The Centre Of Gravity

WARSHIPS IFR Editor Iain Ballantyne talks to Commodore Chris Parry, the Royal Navy's Commander Amphibious Task Group (COMATG).

Above: Vice Admiral Johan Retief, Chief of Navy South African Navy. Below: SAS Amatola, the first of the SAN's four Valour Class frigates, in False Bay, off Simon's Town. Photos: Guy Toremans.

Commodore Parry, where do you think amphibious warfare stands in terms of the various missions that today's Royal Navy is tasked to carry out?

"Littoral warfare, of which the amphibious element is a key component, is the centre of gravity for operations and, as such, I think that we will shortly be seeing new, flexible and adaptive groupings that are fit for any task that may be required. I am very keen on exploring and experimenting with the Expeditionary Strike Group concept, whereby all-arms, predominantly maritime, formations can be constructed and controlled in the Littoral to produce a range of operational and tactical effects, within a network of core and accessed capabilities. It is a question of perception. My role is to influence decisions and events on land through the application of military effect. That implies tasking and coordination of assets that range from cruise missiles at one end of the spectrum to delivering bags of rice at the other. The Royal Navy is currently examining a number of adaptive options that include more flexible and agile arrangements for the command and employment of specialist amphibious and aviation ships in operations. But, I am sure that for perfectly good structural, practical and other reasons, Striking Groups would continue to be formed primarily around their respective major force elements."

What benefits would the ESG concept bring?

"By harnessing emerging network and effects-based thinking and rapid advances in technology, we can increase our tactical agility, precision and access to wider platforms and systems. At the moment, for example, assets and networks that are 'owned' by someone else potentially slow down the response time for any jobs I might have in mind."

With all the new specialist ships in the amphibious order of battle, ranging from the assault ships Albion, Bulwark and Ocean to the new auxiliary LSDs, there has obviously been a massive regeneration of amphibious warfare assets in the RN. Are there any areas of lingering concern?

"I have two main concerns. One is that we will have to work hard to ensure that the ships' primary weapon system - the Royal Marines - is fully configured and integrated to take advantage of the opportunities that these new ships and technologies offer. That means that we will need to train and exercise together far more closely and intensively and ensure that our exercises are not geared to the classic linear, almost administrative, amphibious exercises of recent years. My second concern relates to off-load assets, both surface and air. In both these areas, the littoral possibilities and effect that we can induce are limited by the landing craft, lighterage and helicopter assets that we have. We have practised making the best of what we have, with more innovative solutions to old problems. We have also encouraged the use of more Joint platforms at sea. For example, in terms of helicopters, Chinook has been a notable force multiplier and we are looking forward to Apache's first major deployment with us."

Can't an available Army unit fill in for the Royal Marines?

"There are two things that the Royal Marines do that no other unit in the UK Armed Forces can handle: A variety of assaults from the sea, up to Brigade level, and holding open a littoral amphibious portal. No matter what some people might think, this is not a part time activity, as history and recent operations have shown. However, we are seeing more Army formations adapting to the needs of expeditionary warfare and we want to encourage and exploit all available and relevant systems and capabilities to enhance the range and weight of the overall effect. Recently, we have seen the very real impact that even a small troop of Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks can make, during an exercise, and we want to experiment with other capabilities as well."

Amphibious operations seem to be inherently dangerous, in that they involve steaming up close to an enemy shore and leaping off into the unknown. Is it any wonder that people think long and hard before carrying out fully fledged amphibious assaults?

"There are many ways in which we can minimise the risk as much as possible. One way is finding out more about the potential opponent's backyard than he knows himself, but also identifying opportunities for applying decisive effect. Some of the methods you can use are surprisingly mundane. For instance, during the recent Joint Winter exercise off Norway, we did a lot of research and reconnaissance on the Internet. For example, to assist our surveys of the local terrain, we downloaded freely available commercial satellite imagery of the Norwegian littoral and we were able to use local meteorological web-cams. We scrutinised local ferry times to see if we could use them as decoys to obscure our movements. Then, of course, there are classified sources of information too. Finally, we encouraged the ships to gain confidence and environmental familiarity - putting them through shallow water and narrow points for example, to exploit places they could hide and gain extra protection, by making it impossible for torpedoes or mines to be employed against them."

But, of course, in terms of information, surely an enemy is also exploiting the same opportunities?

"Yes, you do have to be careful that you are not giving anything away. Look at Al-Qaeda - they are masters of exploiting all sorts of open source material. People have to become more aware of potential harm when they willingly allow seemingly innocuous material on the web or talk to the media. On the Internet, we are not exactly the 'Silent Service'!"

At some point, the amphibious force has to show itself and that is surely the moment of maximum vulnerability - out in plain sight of the enemy as it lands the troops and their equipment?

"My philosophy is 'low footprint...high impact'. You should achieve the maximum effect with the smallest number of troops for the minimum amount of time ashore, or with your ships close inshore. The ships of the Task Group should only close the shore when they need to, remaining out of range of the opponent's sensors and weapon systems for the majority of the time. This implies a more dynamic interplay between what you commit to the inshore area and retain in the deep field. It also means a more active appreciation and exploitation of time and space considerations within the overall topography of the Littoral."

Bearing that philosophy in mind, doesn't it worry you that UK amphibious helicopters do not have the 'legs, so to speak, or the long-range lifting power that enables ships to stay at a distance?

"Even so, I think that we do pretty well and, in exploiting to the full the available assets, we'll find a way somehow. We are experimenting with new options for longer-range deployment in our new generation of battlefield rotor craft. It has to be borne in mind that, during operations in Afghanistan, a land-locked country, the Task Group was still able to insert forces several hundred miles inland, through staging and the use of the excellent Chinook. In fact, the Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft programme specifically aims to give the sea-based forces more 'legs' in future."

Will it though? In an era of defence cuts won't the temptation be to make do with a solution that doesn't achieve that objective?

"Those sorts of decisions come around once in a generation, so we have to get them right. As you will have gathered, I am a big fan of the Chinook. Sea King Mk4 does have short legs, but it is still reliable and, in certain scenarios, is the best, most cost-effective option for some missions. The Chinook has more endurance, longer range and greater carrying capacity I want to see as many of them at sea as possible. We have to make the necessary modifications to our ships and aircraft to make that happen."

Is Sea Basing the way forward for all the UK Armed Forces?

"If you look at recent operations, host nation support has been shown to have wide variations in reliability, availability and capacity. An expeditionary strategy requires us to make maximum use of the only means by which we can always guarantee access to all the most important parts of the world."

It's all very well to have these brilliant big ships that can loiter at sea and carry out a variety of tasks but, by cutting back the number of destroyers and frigates that provide a protective screen, isn't the Government putting the major platforms at risk?

"As I said earlier, we are not going to hang around and frankly, if ships cannot make a difference in the Littoral, they won't be there They would go in for the minimum time and then exit or re-deploy as swiftly as possible. We are also working hard to develop more sophisticated Force Protection techniques to deal with a range of conventional and asymmetric threats"

But, in pulling back, don't you then swap the dangers of mines, shore-based artillery and missiles, for the submarine and surface strike threat?

"Your options are inevitably conditioned by the circumstances in which you find yourself and the extent to which you have a handle on the situation. Every tactical event is unique and has to be judged on its merits or disadvantages, but you must have information dominance of that situation if you are to assess risk accurately and find ways 'round all these difficulties. Are the enemy's submarines in port...are they at sea? Has his air force been wiped out comprehensively? Have the weapon systems of his surface ships been maintained properly? Information is an absolutely indispensable enabler."

Do you foresee a time when the division between 'escorts' and amphibious ships will disappear?

"The new Type 45 destroyers and Astute Class SSNs will have a substantial capacity to influence the Littoral Battlespace. In addition to their primary roles, they will have extensive ISTAR and networked capabilities and, the destroyers will be able to carry embarked marines. The new attack boats will improve our ability to deploy and employ Special Forces and other littoral specialist teams. The existing hulls, such as the older destroyers and frigates, are evolving as multi-purpose platforms capable of contributing strongly both singly and collectively in the Littoral, across the range of tasks. However, you will always need specialised shipping to concentrate and achieve critical mass in the pursuit of the mission, although, as I have said, we can adapt the package at any given time and place. It's a hundred years since Jacky Fisher became First Sea Lord and there is definitely a market, if not yet an appetite, for new, radical thinking on a grand scale, especially in the fields of force/impact ratios, the networking of capabilities and the sophisticated exploitation of Information technologies. We should also mention the impact that the new large deck carriers will have, both in the oceanic and littoral regions. In the littoral arena, we need flexible, adaptable ships with modular, cellular arrangements configurable at short notice for various roles and tasks. In these more uncertain times, there also needs to be much more of an accent on proper, credible self-defence, in other words for individual units to take care of themselves. We may have to re-think the requirements and vulnerabilities associated with escort activities, in the light of prevailing routine 'peace-time' threats and the balance of close and distant protection against the likely capabilities of conventional opponents."

But the Royal Navy's new assault ships, Albion and Bulwark, appear rather thinly equipped with self-defence systems...

"They have good point defence, against assessed risks. If they cannot protect themselves in certain circumstances, we have to establish where the balance of risk and advantage lies. If the campaign imperative requires it, they will go in harm's way and we will put in place measures and tactics to ensure their safety as far as possible. But, and I cannot stress this enough, the best defence is for us to keep them out of harm's way for those times when they do not need to be there."

Turning to the question of the Royal Navy as a whole, where do think it stands, especially in the aftermath of the recent cuts?

"The Royal Navy remains a superb world-wide problem-solving organisation, whose people represent an extensive repository of skills and knowledge - a real Force for Good, as we have seen on a variety of occasions at home and abroad. The Fleet still has the ability to go anywhere in the world and tackle any job, whether it be stopping people hacking off limbs in Sierra Leone and, in the process, reinforcing a UN peace-keeping mission, or providing disaster relief for a British Caribbean territory in the wake of a hurricane. It can also fight in high impact operations in partnership with allies."

Do the British people care about any of that over-the-horizon stuff? Isn't it a case of out of sight, out of mind?

"They should because the UK has eight million people abroad at any one time. Our prosperity depends on the stability and integrity of the international system in maintaining the necessary conditions for protecting our investments.

At the end of the day, in our inter-connected world, a great many threats exist and will continue to emerge in the wider world. In any case, the democracies of the world need to hold the ring against these threats while we sort out the large number of transnational and regional problems. Hopefully, the UK's engagement as a Permanent member of the UN Security Council helps make the world a safer and better place."

It is often said that the mark of whether or not the Royal Navy remains an effective force is whether or not it can mount another Falklands campaign. Could the RN of 2004 manage such a task?

"Yes, we could, but we would do it differently. The Fleet may be smaller, but its overall capability is greater and certainly, in terms of Littoral effect, we have more versatility and fighting power than we did in 1982. Having said that, we would have to work hard to build and maintain our logistic train, by incorporating the many lessons from operations in the past few years and from reorganised logistics support in the UK."