Special Report May 2007
ROYAL NAVY COMMENTARY SPECIAL

hard questions for royal navy after iranians hold rn sailors & marines

One of the Cornwall’s Rhibs on boarding operations in the northern Gulf. Photo: Royal Navy.

A diagram issued by the UK Ministry of Defence to illustrate the positions of the British Rhib and the Cornwall, as compared to two contradictory positions for their craft given by the Iranians. Image: UK MoD.

Some of the UK sailors held captive by Iran, arriving at Chivenor in a Sea King helicopter after their release. Photo: Royal Navy.

No one could seriously doubt that the Iranians trespassed into Iraqi waters to kidnap 15 British sailors and marines as they concluded a UN-mandated board-and-search operation in the northern Gulf. The Royal Navy, a world leader in hydrographic surveys and providers of charts to both naval and merchant mariners the world over, conclusively showed the Iranians were lying when they claimed the two Rhibs, from the Type 22 frigate HMS Cornwall, were actually inside their waters. The Iranians also blatantly lied about where the act of piracy they had committed actually took place.

However, serious questions about the Royal Navy’s operating procedures remained to be answered even after the pantomime of the hostages’ release by the Iranians in a masterly manipulation of the media for propaganda purposes.

Despite intelligence clearly indicating Iran was determined to take prisoner Western military personnel as a reprisal for Coalition forces in Iraq seizing its own officials, and the on-going stand-off between the West and the Tehran regime over its nuclear weapons programme, HMS Cornwall’s boarding teams seemed to be caught completely unawares.
How and why were the signs that Iran was about to take action ignored?
Among the others questions to be asked, and answered by an inquiry, are: Why did Cornwall’s Lynx helicopter not remain on station overhead as the group carried out their search of a cargo vessel? Why did the boarding party apparently board the cargo vessel on the side not visible to their mother ship? Why didn’t the two British Rhibs simply use their high-speed capability to break away from the Iranians, who were using boats ill-suited as weapons platforms? Were Rules of Engagement robust enough for the HMS Cornwall sailors and marines to resist the Iranians? With a similar British group kidnapped by Tehran some three years earlier, but on the Shatt-al-Arab, rather than in open waters, why were the fourteen male and one female naval personnel not better trained to resist the manipulation of Iran while in captivity?

The incident has surely prompted an investigation into training of UK naval boarding parties carrying out operations in the high-risk northern Gulf.

However, it is thought British Rules of Engagement are not as robust as those used by the Americans. Additionally, it has been pointed out that a state of war does not exist between Iran and the UK, so it was perhaps wise for the HMS Cornwall boarding teams not to escalate the situation by resisting when faced with Rocket-Propelled Grenades and heavy machines guns.

Some good reasons for not putting up a fight and also for seemingly over-eager co-operation with their captors were provided by the UK hostages after their release by Iran.

During a press conference at a Royal Marines base in north Devon, the two officers who led the British group gave their reasons for acting as they did in the face of unwarranted Iranian action.

Lieutenant Felix Carman, Royal Navy, told the media: "On Friday 23 March I along with 14 of my colleagues were part of a routine boarding patrol. We deployed from HMS Cornwall in two Rigid Inflatable Boats and patrolled into an area south of the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway. This was meant to be a routine boarding operation and followed approximately 66 similar such boarding's over the previous four weeks. We approached an unidentified merchant vessel that our supporting helicopter had identified as worth investigation. We carried out a completely compliant boarding with the full cooperation of the Master and crew. The Royal Marines secured the vessel and the RN element of the boarding party then arrived and commenced a thorough search of the ship. This was in complete accordance with our UN mandate and as part of an International Coalition. We were equipped with Xeres true navigational equipment and hand held GPS for backup. The helicopter in support provided continuous navigational confirmation and we were also linked to HMS Cornwall who were monitoring our exact position at all times. Let me make it absolutely clear, irrespective of what has been said in the past, when we were detained by the IRG we were inside internationally recognised Iraqi territorial waters and I can clearly state we were 1.7 nautical miles from Iranian waters."

Captain Christopher Air, Royal Marines, took up the story: "It was during the boarding that we noticed the helicopter had returned to 'Mother', and we started calling the ship on VHF [radio] to find out why. A short while later two speed boats were spotted approaching rapidly about 400 metres away. I ordered everyone to make their weapons ready and ordered the boarding party to return to the boats. By the time all were back on board, two Iranian boats had come alongside. One officer spoke good English and I explained that we were conducting a routine operation, as allowed under a UN mandate. But when we tried to leave, they prevented us by blocking us in. By now it was becoming increasingly clear that they had arrived with a planned intent. Some of the Iranian sailors were becoming deliberately aggressive and unstable. They rammed our boat and trained their heavy machine guns, RPGs and weapons on us. Another six boats were closing in on us. We realised that our efforts to reason with these people were not making any headway. Nor were we able to calm some of the individuals down. It was at this point that we realised that had we resisted there would have been a major fight, one we could not have won with consequences that would have had major strategic impact. We made a conscious decision to not engage the Iranians and do as they asked. They boarded our boats, removed our weapons and steered the boats towards the Iranian shore.”

Lt Carman resumed his explanation of what happened: "On arrival at a small naval base, we were blindfolded, stripped of all our kit and led to a room where I declared myself as the officer in charge and was introduced to a local commander. Two hours later we were moved to a second location and throughout the night were subjected to random interrogations. The questions were aggressive and the handling rough, but it was no worse than that. The following morning we were flown to Tehran and transported to a prison where the atmosphere changed completely. We were blindfolded, our hands were bound and we were forced up against a wall. Throughout our ordeal we faced constant psychological pressure. Later we were stripped and then dressed in pyjamas. The next few nights were spent in stone cells, approximately 8'x6', sleeping on piles of blankets. All of us were kept in isolation. We were interrogated most nights, and presented with two options. If we admitted we had strayed, we would be on a plane back to the UK soon. If we didn't we faced up to seven years in prison. We all at one time or another made a conscious decision to make a controlled release of non operational information. We were kept in isolation until the last few nights when we were allowed to gather for a few hours together, in the full glare of Iranian media. On day 12 we were taken to a Governmental complex blindfolded and then given three piece suits to wear. We watched the President's statement live on TV, and it was only then that we realise we were to be sent home. It goes without saying that there was a huge moment of elation. We were made to line up to meet the president, one at a time. My advice to everyone was not to mess this up now - we all wanted to get home. Afterwards - and still blindfolded - we were taken back to the hotel and for the first time met with UK representatives including the Ambassador before boarding our flight back to Heathrow."
Captain Air gave his initial reaction to some of the media coverage of the incident, not all of it portraying him or his colleagues in a good light:  "In the short time we have been back we have not been able to see all that has been broadcast or written about our ordeal. We are aware that many people have questioned why we allowed ourselves to be taken in the first place and why we allowed ourselves to be shown by the Iranian authorities on television. Let me be absolutely clear, from the outset it was very apparent that fighting back was simply not an option. Had we chosen to do so then many of us would not be standing here today. Of that I have no doubts. The Iranian Navy did not turn up lightly armed; they came with intent, heavy weapons, and very quickly surrounded us. We were equipped, armed and had rules of engagement for boarding operations within Iraqi water. We were not prepared to fight a heavily armed force who it is our impression came out deliberately into Iraqi waters to take us prisoner. Reasoning with the Iranians was our only option. We tried. We did our utmost to de-escalate the situation, but our words fell on deaf ears. They had come with a clear purpose and were never going to leave without us. The Iranians are not our enemies. We are not at war with them. Our rules of engagement at that time stated that we could only use lethal force if we felt that we were in imminent danger of a loss of life. By the time the true intent of the Iranians had become apparent - and we could have legitimately fought back - it was too late for action. We were completely surrounded, and in addition to the loss of life, any attempted to fight back would caused a major international incident and an escalation of tension within the region. Our team had seconds to make a decision and we believe that we made the right decision.”

He concluded: “We still believe this was the right thing to do."

Lt Carman then explained why HMS Cornwall did not come to the aid of the group: "Some have questioned why HMS Cornwall did not provide greater protection for the team. HMS Cornwall is there to guard the vital oil platforms and command the coalition forces. She is also the platform by where boarding teams can launch from and patrol out. Not only should she not have been closer to us but she physically could not have been; the water is simply too shallow. We are all immensely proud to be members of her crew and look forward to rejoining her.” He concluded his telling of the facts by stressing three further points, just to make sure everyone knew the reality of the situation: "When taken by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard we were well inside Iraqi territorial waters. The detention was clearly illegal and not a pleasant experience. We as a group held out for as long as we though appropriate. We then complied up to a point with our captors. We remain Immensely proud of our team. Their courage and dignity throughout their illegal detention was in line with the best tradition of the service. Throughout our ordeal we have tried to remain very much a team. No one individual should be singled out but we are now very aware of the special treatment singled out to [Leading Seaman] Faye Turney. Faye is a young mother and wife. She volunteered to join the Royal Navy and is very proud to continue to serve. She is a highly professional operator and we are incredibly proud to have her as part of our team. The fact she is a women has been used as a propaganda tool by Iran. This is deeply regrettable. She is coming to terms with what has happened to her and not only Faye and her family but all of us are finding the press focus very uncomfortable and difficult and specifically request that you give all of us the space and privacy we need when we return to our homes."

Having given a reasonable explanation of why the HMS Cornwall group capitulated to the Iranians and subsequent behaviour in detention, most of the questions had been answered, and it was likely the media frenzy over the story would then have abated.
However, members of the HMS Cornwall group were then given special permission to sell their stories to newspapers and television, something it was suspected was part of a propaganda war with Iran. This move provoked outrage across the UK, especially as servicemen and women wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan  have not been able to profit from selling their stories and nor were sailors and marines in the group captured by Iran in 2004, who received far tougher treatments while in captivity. There were many who said it was a serious blow to the dignity of the UK Armed Forces and seriously undermined their previously unassailable position of respect in British society. The fact that the release of the Cornwall group by Iran came at the same time as four British soldiers killed by a suspected Iranian explosive device in southern Iraq, also did not sit well. Despite efforts by Navy chiefs to explain that it was only right for the Royal Navy personnel to tell their story, rather than the media digging for more information, and possibly getting it wrong, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne admitted it was an error.

Announcing a subsequent immediate ban on service personnel selling their stories, Des Browne - who had been severely criticized within and outside the Armed Forces for not showing leadership - said in an apologetic statement: "I recognise the dilemma that faced the Royal Navy last week.” He went on: "The Naval officers who had the responsibility of looking after the young people detained in Iran saw that the pressure on them and their families made it inevitable that some of them would accept media offers to tell their story in return for payment. The dilemma facing the Navy was this; should they refuse to give them permission to accept payment, recognising that some of them would find ways to tell their experiences anyway, without the support and advice of their service, and therefore with greater risk to themselves and crucially also at risk to operational security? Or should the Navy accept that in this particular and exceptional case, and in the modern media environment, they should give permission for these young people to tell their story precisely in order to stay close to them but accepting the consequence of the potential payment involved? Many strong views on this have been expressed but I hope people will understand that this was a very tough call, and that the Navy had a duty to support its people. Nevertheless all of us who have been involved over the last few days recognise we have not reached a satisfactory outcome. We must learn from this.”

Mr Browne explained that there would be a review of the regulations governing whether or not members of the Armed Forces could sell their stories. Quite why the Royal Navy and the Ministry of Defence, which contains many media management practitioners could not anticipate the furore that would arise remains a mystery. Allowing servicemen and women to earn money from their experiences while operations they were involved in, or working in support of, are still on-going is not only distasteful but full of all sorts of other pitfalls, not least the insult to the relatives of those killed and wounded in those same operations, none of whom had been allowed to sell their stories. Presumably it also failed to occur to the Ministry of Defence that, as servants of the State, it is also incumbent on members of the Armed Forces to explain their actions on behalf of the UK as part of the democratic process and free-of-charge.
In fact, this is exactly what happened at Chivenor and there the story could have rested in lieu of an inquiry, for the media’s thirst for information had been largely satisfied.

Hard questions remain for both the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy to answer

The Type 22frigate HMS Cornwall in the northern Gulf, leading the Coalition operation to protect Iraq’s oil platforms. Photo: Royal Navy.

• For more reports on US and British naval forces in the Gulf, see WARSHIPS IFR magazine.